partial exception of the USA) restricting extended family entry would not greatly reduce the numbers admitted. Such a measure would then have limited potential for creating space for more refugees.
Family migration has come to constitute such a significant a proportion of overall migration because of limits on other grounds for entry, and follows from a long-term pattern of individual migration. But contemporary family migration does not conform to the conventional image of a single male worker being joined by wife and children. It includes simultaneous whole family migration in settler states; female-led migration where husbands are joining, and (where policies allow) cohabiting partners, both hetero-and homosexual; parents and grandparents; other dependants of various ages and degrees of relationship; the parents of minor children who are citizens (born in ius soli countries); and members of dissolved or reconstituted families. It gives rise to a range of issues thrown up by the fact that migration is no longer typically a single movement but a 'transnational' process involving repeated mobility, both circular (between receiving and original countries) and to third countries.
For the purposes of this paper I will assume, with Gibney and others, that entry to and residence in a state are matters of distributive justice (setting aside the question whether membership is). Secondly, I assume that while some kind of limits on entry may be justified, not all limits on entry are equally justified; thus whom states admit or reject is not to be understood just as a matter of choice (Carens, 2003) . States may have obligations to admit immigrants within certain limits of social and political integration, and to give priority in admission to certain kinds of people.
In what follows I first review arguments in favour of awarding substantial weight to family reunification in admissions from the point of view of citizens and denizens, the state, and incomers in turn. These include: the intrinsic value of and right to family life, the possibility of integration, and the agent-specific nature of the obligations involved. I next examine some arguments we might consider for reducing the weight given to family considerations in migration, namely the anachronistic nature of the family claim, the voluntary nature of migration, the contemporary prevalence of transnational family relationships, and, finally, the inheritance of privilege and the multiplier effect of family reunification. I then address the questions whether and how it might be justifiable to discriminate among family members for admission, and if so, on what basis? I ask if restricting family reunification to immediate family is culturally discriminatory, or may run counter to our fundamental reasons for respecting family life. Finally I outline some sorts of changes in current family reunification policies that may be justified on the basis of these considerations. 6 Here I discuss only family reunification strictly speaking, that is, the immigration of members of already established families, and not families in formation, or immigration for marriage, which now constitutes a significant, growing and controversial part of family migration. While important, this raises different issues, some of which have been interestingly addressed by Trappenburg (Trappenburg, 2005) .
'Home is where when you go there they have to take you in': reasons for favouring family reunification
The reasons for giving very significant weight to family reunification in migration are not difficult to reconstruct. As Gibney himself acknowledges, few things are more important than being allowed reside with one's spouse and dependent children. To require a state to curtail their entrance would be to ask it to bear a very heavy burden. Even refugees would be hard pressed to deny the force of the claim of families to be together (Gibney, 2004: 243) .
These claims may be considered in terms of the interests not only of those seeking to be joined by family members, who may be either citizens, permanent or temporary residents (referred to here as citizens/denizens, and defined as those subject to the state's authority), but also of the state, and of the incoming family members (referred to here as incomers). a) The claim of citizens/denizens may be considered to rest in the widely held principle that family life is a human right, and one embodied in many written documents. (John, 2003: 1) ).
The importance such instruments attribute to family life may be best understood as based on a fundamental human interest in and need for what is sometimes called affiliation (Nussbaum, 1992 (Nussbaum, , 2000 . In the case of the family, this lies specifically in establishing and living in intimate relationships of affection and support that entail giving and receiving care in those aspects of our lives that involve necessary dependence, including childhood and old age (Kittay, 1999) . 10 While there are other kinds of important affiliation, the family is distinguished by its intimacy and long-term personal commitment that characteristically involve its members living together. The value of family life may be seen as a matter of personal intimacy as much as physical support, of giving and receiving 'care' in the broadest sense. Care is characterised by a concern that permeates family relationships; thus it entails performing duties as much as exercising privileges. But it is not constituted by duties alone, and the exact obligations it entails vary with relationships, circumstances and need. Thus, for example, the concern that grandparents will feel for their grandchildren (and vice versa) will entail different kinds of obligations of substantial support depending on particular circumstances. The reason a state may be considered to have a prima facie obligation to admit family members lies in the importance of such relationships, in which members have agentspecific obligations of care to one another. The right to family life may be thought of as a universal right to discharge special obligations, which recognises the value of particular
relations. In what follows, I assume that family members have certain special obligations to one another by virtue of their relationship, and I characterise these in terms of a broad notion of care. I address the distribution of such obligations within families, which may be less easy to determine, and their detailed content, which may be liable to considerable cultural variation, only insofar as they directly affect the grounds for admission.
b there is a dual aspect to the claim for entry: a universalist basis for the incomer, and a partialist basis for the person being joined.
These entrants claim to be admitted on the grounds that they should be allowed to join -to be reunited -with their family members, their spouses, children, siblings, etc.
While refugees and other economic migrants often base their claims for entrance on need alone, the situation of the family entrant is more complicated. In their case, the state is faced with a claim on two fronts: not only does the foreigner concerned have a claim for entry based on universal considerations -'Take me in because families should be together'. But the state's members, many of whom are former immigrants, also have a claim of a particular sort: you owe it to me as a citizen to allow my cousin, daughter or spouse to enter (Gibney, 2004: 13-14) .
Note that he uses the term 'members', while including former immigrants who have become citizens. This assumes that the claim is based on membership. On my formulation, it is not membership, but subjection to the state that gives rise to the claim. I agree that the claim of the incomer is different. The state does not have the same kind of obligation to allow incomers to be united with their family in the state as it has to denizens and citizens already under its authority. Thus, it is easier to say why the latter should be allowed to live together with their families here, for example. But the difference is not, I argue, necessarily the one that Gibney identifies. If it is the strongest partialist case, we might look at just in what way it is partialist.
For Gibney the modern state 'is at base a particularistic agent, defined by a responsibility to privilege the interest and concerns of its own citizens' (Gibney 2004, 197) . Indeed, if we take states seriously, we have to take integration, and the possibility of maintaining democratic structures and practices seriously. We may think there are some special obligations among citizens of democratic states that stem from their being members of a potentially selfgoverning political community, obligations, for example, of consideration, communication and trust. 15 But it is not necessarily the case that they, and the state as their agent, owe one another global preference in all areas of life. Even as members of a democratic community, obligations may be more differentiated. My argument is that it is not clear that there are good reasons for a special obligation among citizens based on national or state 'membership' to admit their family members. 16 Instead we may see it as an obligation on the state to those under its authority, whose family life it obstructs or facilitates through its immigration laws.
Rather than seeing the state's obligation to allow the reunion of the citizen/denizen's family as based on partialist grounds that treat group members more favourably than outsiders, this should be understood as a universal obligation on states to allow those within the ambit of their authority to pursue family life.
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Where a prospective incomer has family in several countries, the state may argue that there is no reason why they should be admitted to this one. But we might consider that each of these states has a prima facie obligation to admit. A combination of other factors, including personal and cultural considerations, may tilt the balance towards particular family members and the state in which they live. In this case it seems reasonable to think of this as at least equally a matter for the family to determine as the state. This gives states less room to dismiss claims on the basis that there are equivalent relatives elsewhere with whom a migrant could live.
Rather than favouring co-citizens on the basis of membership, the state thus allows those who are subject to its authority, whose lives and actions it controls, to enjoy the affection and support of intimate relations just as other citizens/residents. Not to do so would be to dominate them arbitrarily on the basis of their status. This is a universal obligation to allow others who are vulnerable to us to observe their justified special obligations, or claims to care
for particular others -obligations to one another that fall particularly on them in virtue of their relationship, which means that only they can fulfil them. Thus special obligations are nested within overall universal obligations.
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Thus far we have seen that there is a strong argument in favour of family reunification:
because family life is generally recognised as a human right, based on the fundamental interest of giving and receiving care in intimate relations; and (secondarily and more practically) because it promotes the integration of immigrants, and clearly identifies which state has the obligation to admit in certain cases. It is supported by universalist arguments, and is not merely the strongest example of a partialist case. But there is another side to the story.
Arguments against favouring family reunification
As well as the more urgent need of refugees, there are other arguments that might make us reconsider the weight given to family reunification. These include: the anachronistic nature of the family claim, the extent to which migration is voluntary, the contemporary prevalence of dispersed family life, and, finally, the problem of inherited privilege and the multiplier effect.
The first three arguments question the strength of the 'value of family life' argument as a support for family reunification, while the third identifies positive injustices that the priority of family reunification in migration entails.
a) The family claim as anachronistic: friends are the new family?
It may be argued that the importance of the institution of the family has declined, and that other less formal kinds of relationship or partnerships have succeeded the legally or genetically defined family. Identifying the family with care romanticises it, when it would be better understood as an economic than as an affective unit. Whereas it might have been appropriate to give family reunification a significant weight in the past, families are now not as central to people's lives in a world of late-forming and early and frequently dissolving partnerships, small nuclear families, increasing numbers of one-person households with broad groups of friends and support groups, and so forth. 19 But while the legal and genetic aspects of family relationships may be less important than in the past, the fundamental significance of the family, more than friends, remains as a locus of relatively permanent or durable relations of shared affection and support, of joint projects over time, characteristically relations of intergenerational care and concern across a lifetime. 20 Such relationships may be found in cohabiting and same-sex partnerships (and other relationships) that do not all fit under the legal or genetic conceptions of family (though some are working to put them under the same or comparable legal footing) but they constitute a reconceptualisation of, rather than superseding, the family. Thus there is a problem if states recognise as families only those falling into the strict legal or genetic category, rather than including these other kinds of intimate relationships. And only some states recognise partnerships other than formal marriage for family reunification, including both heterosexual and homosexual cohabitation.
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Indeed just as the state has reasons for facilitating family reunification, it may also have reasons not to expand its understanding in this way. One pragmatic reason (apart from a simple interest in limiting numbers) for states to discriminate between family members is that it is easier to identify genetically and legally-connected family members than less clear-cut ties, and thus to distinguish those who may be thought to have justified claims to enter from those who do not. 22 Though this may not be the best basis for exclusion, it has the merit of being transparent and non-dominating -those who apply can know what their chances are, rather than having to try to conform to an array of other more nebulous conditions. There is some point to this argument, given the implications of extending relationships to include all kinds of partnerships or co-implicated lives. Yet if the family has changed its form, to the extent that people live in relatively durable relationships of care, immigration policy needs to take account of these.
b) The extent to which migration is voluntary
A second argument is that migration is a voluntary decision, in which migrants balance the benefits of migration against its costs, including separation from their families. Therefore they must bear those costs, and have no strong claim to family reunification. This might possibly be true to the extent that migration is strictly voluntary. But it is not clear that it is involuntary only in the case of refugees (to whom family reunification is often more readily granted than to other categories of migrant). Economic migrants fall at different places on the spectrum from voluntary to involuntary, depending on considerations such as the degree of deprivation.
One approach would be to favour family reunification only where migration is clearly more involuntary than voluntary. 23 Today migration is typically not a once-off, one-way movement, but often a continuing process, and many families are internationally dispersed as a matter of course. This is not a problem only of 'guest workers' from disadvantaged societies. The expectation that family members should always live together (or in close proximity) is reduced. The fact of better communications and cheaper travel make it less onerous to carry on family relationships at a distance. So, it is less obvious that obligations to family (in the broadest sense) need always to be discharged by bringing them to live with you -or even the same country -but may often be met by keeping in contact, visiting fairly regularly, and providing financial support.
This may be partly true, but it tends to overlook those kinds of family relations that require more immediate intimacy and support: for the very young, the old and the ill and incapacitated, and the difficulties of caring at a distance where family members try to provide or organise this immediate care when they are not continuously present (Kofman, 2004: 246) .
It has often been acknowledged, including by communitarians (and defenders of controls on migration) such as Walzer, that time is a significant factor in considerations about immigration and membership. Even if we consider that a state has a right in general to decide whom to admit and whom to reject, a person who has lived (arguably even illegally) in a country for a long time may be deemed to have become part of that society, and the cost to them of deportation may be considered too high, so that they should be allowed to remain and indeed to become members (Walzer 1985 , Carens 2005 . A different dimension of time may be important in considering whether (and which) family members have a strong claim to be admitted. There are 'critical times' in family relationships -between spouses, between parents and young children, and arguably between adult children and elderly parents -when the rights and obligations of family relations more urgently require that they be together. Some kinds of family relationships at certain times depend on immediacy to be sustained. In others, having to be absent, for example, during one's children's early years or at the end of a parent's life will, at the very least, give cause for serious regret to the parent or adult child, and equally to the child or old person deprived of their care. If entry is refused or a delay of years imposed, something is lost forever.
This suggests a basis for prioritising family reunification especially at these critical times.
(And indeed Australian immigration law recognises this, and has a provision for admitting family members on the basis of care for an existing resident, independent of the specific legal or genetic relationship.) Such an argument extends to temporary migrants, if they are separated longer than the minimum period which it is reasonable to expect families to live apart, and especially at those 'critical times' in family relationships (where this period may be shorter). But before we can consider this, it is necessary to address a more substantial objection to giving priority to family members.
d) Inheritance of privilege
If entry or permanent residence in prosperous liberal democratic states is a scarce resource, why should those who happen to be related to others have privileged access to it? Even if we accept that citizens/denizens have a claim on universal grounds to be joined by their families, the incomer's claim to join the family does not necessarily constitute a valid claim to the good of residence in a western state. The state cannot grant one without the other, and (as governments often argue) other alternatives are often available, that may include returning together to the country of origin, or going to a third country where one of the family members has associations. On this basis, it could be argued that, for the incomer, access to residence through the mere fact of genetic relationship is an unearned privilege, analogous to a form of property; and that one should not be able to inherit simply on the basis of one's birth and relationship to others. This has been argued about forms of access to citizenship based both on parentage and place of birth (Carens, 1987 , Shachar, 2003 (Cole, 2000: 13) The inheritance of privilege is compounded by the multiplier effect whereby those, such as siblings, who gain entry on family grounds may in turn be joined by their family members, thus exacerbating the scarcity of places. In addition to taking up available places, family migration has given rise to powerful political lobbies that skew future immigration policy in favour of family reunification (Gibney 2004: 225) . The strength of this objection applies not only to citizens, but also to permanent residents. Is there any reason why those who have been fortunate enough to gain entry and residence in a western state should be able to pass on this privilege simply on the basis of kinship? They may owe their family a great deal, and have an obligation and desire to remain in contact with and support them. But it is not clear why they
should be able to hold places in the queue, or present their relatives with a fast-track to residence and all the advantages over others that this brings. This central claim to family reunification does not make entry any less of a privilege for the incomer. To the extent that systems of family reunification function simply as a form of property -admitting people with whom there are very limited relations of affection and support, they may be considered less justifiable.
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However, while there may be an element of arbitrariness for the incomer (who has a priority in the affections of the citizen/denizen, but is not owed anything by the state), the claim of the citizen/denizen on the state is not arbitrary (even if their original standing as citizens and denizens of a western state itself may be arbitrary in certain respects). Once they are living under that state's authority, their interest and right in family life is valid. The claim of citizens/denizens to be joined by their family is stronger than that of the incomer to enter. The obligation and privilege of caring for and being cared for by one's own family is based in a well-grounded interest. And sponsoring a family member often entails a considerable degree of commitment, at least to their initial support.
Having considered these objections to prioritising family reunification, we may conclude that there are arguments for a more flexible, less narrowly-defined conception of the family for immigration purposes, and for giving particularly significant weight to reunification claims at the critical periods of family life; conversely claims to family reunification that in substance mainly facilitate access to a prosperous society, or which contribute to the multiplier effect, are less justified.
Distinguishing between immediate and extended family members
I next turn to the question whether a just solution to reducing family migration is to discriminate among family members -between immediate and other relations, or on criteria such as residence status or the characteristics of incoming family members? Or are there other more justifiable kinds of distinctions we might make? This raises questions about how we define the scope of family obligations.
Gibney argues that the entrance practices of liberal democratic states would be morally superior if the claims of refugees were considered as important as those of family entrants. The conclusion gains added force if we distinguish between two types of family members commonly allowed to enter western states -immediate (spouses, dependent children, etc.) and extended (siblings, non-dependent children, etc. family members). (Gibney, 2004: 14-15) .
He admits that 'These people may also have some moral claim to enter. But it is reasonable to believe that their claim lacks the force -the necessity -that lies behind the claim for entry of the refugee.' (Gibney, 2004: 243) We should note that in fact most states do not operate very undiscriminating family reunification policies. In recognising a right to be joined by family, states differentiate among citizens and non-citizens, permanent and temporary residents, and among these according to length of residence permit. They cite alternative options for reunification in the country of origin or a third country, they require conditions of minimum income, quality of the denizen's housing or other resources, and they impose long waiting periods. With respect to incomers, states discriminate on the basis of age (with upper age limits for dependent children that vary within Europe from 12 to 21), health, educational level, dependency/ability to work or be selfsupporting, and, increasingly, capacity for integration (including but not limited to language abilities). They impose restrictions on length of stay, access to the labour market, and access to social benefits. For partners (depending on the relationships recognised), they limit entry, and demand cohabitation after arrival; they require long prior residence for granting continuing residence status in the case of divorce (e.g. up to 4 years in Germany and 6 in Denmark). Finally, they exercise wide discretionary powers to allow or refuse family reunification (SOPEMI 2000: 11) . I have already noted that European states (while working with more legally effective provisions for family reunification) are rather more restrictive than the USA in the definition of family. They do not give preference to siblings, they limit rights in many categories to dependants, and they distinguish between rights of EU-citizens and others (even if born in the country). 25 Though since 2003 the right of family migration for spouses and children of third-country nationals is granted in principle, this is with a considerable degree of conditionality.
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I do not have space here to examine all these distinctions and conditions, but it seems clear that some and not others can be justified on the basis of the more valid reasons for exclusion (integration and maintaining a democratic state) and accord better with the grounds identified here for giving substantial consideration to the family claim (engagement in continuing relationships of care and support) rather than being driven mainly by economic considerations of the apparent balance of cost and contribution to the receiving state.
Before we agree that, in order to limit the volume of family migration, we should accept for migration purposes a restriction of family to immediate relations, taking spouses and dependent children under eighteen as a shorthand for those relationships of substantial commitment, intimacy and need for care that we should allow to live together, we need to consider some objections. Is this a culturally biased definition of the family, and does it run counter to the value of the family, and the scope of family obligations, identified here?
Arguments against discriminating between immediate and non-immediate family: a) Discriminating between immediate and family members is culturally biased
The first objection we might consider is that limiting admission to immediate family members is culturally biased, and privileges the particular conception of the family prevailing in Northern European (rather than even all Western) cultures. It thus discriminates against cultures in which members of the extended family are closely interconnected and interdependent. Even in Mediterranean countries, adult children tend to live near and interact extensively with their parents, and cousins and other relatives can be part of a living family unit. In some cultures adult unmarried women live with and remain dependent on their parents. In China, despite many cultural changes under communism and now under the rapid growth of capitalism, one abiding central feature of social life is the expectation that children will support their parents in old age.
Even if good reasons (to do with individual autonomy) can be offered not to recognise all existing family practices -for example, for prescribing a minimum age for marriage and ruling out polygamous marriage (Trappenburg, 2005) , it is not so clear that western states can justifiably deny that in some cultures extended family life may be as valuable, and its members as psychologically and socially interdependent as those of nuclear families in western societies. No doubt, immigrants have to make certain adjustments to the societies to which they have moved, but the distinction between what is expected of people in public and in private life would suggest that these adjustments might be less with respect to aspects of family life of which we have otherwise no good reason to be critical. Against this, it may be argued that extended family life is a substitute for many of the associations and benefits provided by civil society and the state in western societies, and so neither so necessary (or even possible) there. 27 Moreover, not all the reasons for extended family networks may be ones that support a need for close proximity. Even if differences in family structures should be taken into account in constructing policies on family reunification, to the extent that living with or in the same country as one's extended family is more a matter of preference than of real need, a greater range of restrictions on admission of family migrants would be acceptable.
Whatever we might conclude on this, it requires more argument than can be developed here.
b) The importance of relationships beyond the immediate family: parents and grandparents
Even without going culturally very far afield, we may identify ways in which restrictions on family migration beyond the immediate family appear to run against the basic values on which the claim to family life is recognised. Thus current provisions for immediate family reunification appear to undervalue some central relationships of affection and support. To take an example that highlights the narrow conception of family at work in immigration policy, ascending relatives (parents and grandparents), although they represent an important dimension of family life in most societies, are not standardly given a priority in terms of family reunion. Canada and Finland are among the few exceptions here. In the USA, while citizens can be joined by ascending relatives, there are no provisions under the family preference scheme for residents to be joined by parents. Within the EU, only dependent parents (and not grandparents) of citizens count as family for mobility purposes, and the 2003 directive applying to third country nationals allows rather than requires Member States to admit ascending relatives. 28 Thus one commentator has observed that in Europe, '[t]he generally limited conceptualisation of the family leaves little consideration for problems generated by caring at a distance… cultural differences in familial relations, and the role of grandparents or other collateral relations in providing nurturing and support for different members of the family' (Kofman, 2004: 246) . and the impact of these forms of dependency on the primary carer in the host state' (Ackers, 2004: 385) . Such restrictions also overlook the way in which grandparents provide a framework for families: 'the instability of marriages and partnerships has turned grandparents into important representatives of stability and continuity ' (Wilk, 2000 : 26 cited in Ackers, 2004 . This is not only a matter of psychological support; grandparents may play a significant practical role in child-care and domestic affairs.
While transnational families have to deal with the problems of caring at a distance, some kinds of long-distance caring are more feasible than others -for older children, grandparents with other supports, and indigent family members, depending on the trade-offs between difficulties of movement and difficulties in their current living conditions. Just as there are arguments that adequate aid to the needy where they already they live may be as good and better than facilitating migration, so too there are arguments that people may sometimes be better cared for where they are (if they can study, if they are old and have social contacts, etc.)
rather than moving to join other members of their family. (This is independent of whether there are other family members who can fulfil the obligation of care.) Certain kinds of economic dependence, for example, do not require physical presence or interaction. In some cases the child or parent will fare better on the basis of material support, such as remittances, which go further in the country of origin, and will be less subject to social dislocation, given language and other difficulties.
But, like the relationships between partners, and between parents and young children, those of adult children and elderly parents often fall into a different category. We may conclude that priority in family admission should be given to those with a duty and a right to care, a significant part of which only they can discharge in person -at that particular time: namely partners, young children and elderly parents. Not only should these be admitted for citizens, permanent and temporary workers alike, but they should not be subject to the sorts of waiting periods or integration tests that are often imposed, since these run counter to the provision of such care.
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Thus the importance of allowing the exercise of care for elderly parents does not depend on their needing to live with, and be directly materially cared for by their children. The element of material support in care may be in private or public care institutions; but this is separate from the personal contact and specific affection that only family members (or direct equivalents) provide, as well as crucial mediation and advocacy in the delivery of material care itself, all of which require proximity.
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Giving priority on this basis still gives certain people privileged access. But in the case of elderly parents and grandparents, it does not have a significant multiplier effect (unless adult non-dependent children are also favoured in admission). Young children clearly raise a more substantial problem in this respect, but in this case their interest in being with their parents carries a heavy weight relative to other considerations. Justifiable distinctions among family members would give greater priority to those in dense networks of support and care that arise at critical periods of youth, illness, age and disability. This would be different from the legal categories given priority in many liberal democracies, but would not coincide with the immediate nuclear family either.
Conclusion
Both theoretically and more pragmatically it is not clear that we can easily improve the justice of migration by reordering priorities between family migration and refugees. Solving the problem of scarce resources of access to western liberal democracies by restricting the priority of family migration, more particularly by limiting it to immediate family members, seems implausible, since the bulk of family migration is that of spouses, followed by dependent children.
None of this is to deny the strength and urgency of refugees' claims -but to show that balancing their claims and those of others requires further consideration. Before we try to rank the priority of admission of refugees and family members, it is worth first thinking about what it is that makes family life valuable, and the priorities we might thus recognise among family members. Family reunification is justified not in terms of a partial preference towards fellow citizens (and residents), but as a universal obligation (to insiders and outsiders in different ways) to allow people to establish and maintain intimate relationships and practices of affection and support. It stems from a more basic obligation to those subject to the authority of the state, whose need for family life we are in a unique position to support.
The idea that family migration should be restricted gains its greatest force from the systems in which family is defined in terms of legal and genetic relationships rather than those of continuing care. If we understand the family as a relationship of care, we might recommend a different reach for family migration, one that calls for an adjustment to most states' provisions in this area. In particular this would place a premium on the admission of partners, of young children and their parents, and of old people and their family members -those who give or depend on receiving immediate care at critical times of life. It would involve reducing differences in the treatment of citizens, permanent and shorter-term residents with respect to family reunification. At the same time, it would be reasonable to restrict the entry of those who are less mutually interdependent, as in the case of siblings and still more so of broader extended family. This would be more restrictive than the USA and EU in some respects, but more generous in others. It would require a restriction of the family preference system in the USA, where spouses and children of permanent residents come behind adult children of citizens. But it would involve an extension there to include the ascending relatives of permanent residents. And nearly everywhere it would require giving more consideration to established cohabiting partners. Before we try to balance the admission of refugees and family migrants, the principle of family reunification needs to be applied more even-handedly. Alexovicova (2005) . 10 'To grow, flourish and survive or endure illness, frailty and disability each individual requires a caring relationship with significant others who hold that individual's well-being as a primary responsibility and a primary good-together with the principle of doulia-that just as we have required care to survive and thrive, so we need to provide conditions that allow others, including those who do the work of caring, to receive the care that they need to survive and thrive -point to an approach that authorises the use of social resources for the support of relationships of dependency' (Kittay, 1999:186-7) . 11 Feasibility is also a state concern. Arguably, a state wishing to admit more of those in need could sell this electorally more easily on the basis of family reunification than other grounds, as people identify with the need for family life and its implications for admission. A striking feature of recent Irish experience of immigration and specifically of asylum seeking has been the support by neighbours for families threatened with deportation, even where their remaining would involve significant charges on the state. The breadth of support for the sixyear old autistic twin Great Agbonlahor between 2005 and his deportation in 2007 contrasts sharply with the silence on the mainly adult male Afghan hunger strikers who occupied a Dublin cathedral in 2006. 12 For example, where work is not permitted, where qualifications are not recognised, where up-skilling is made difficult or impossible, or where language training is difficult to access. 13 Courts have deemed constitutional protection of the family to extend to both nationals and aliens and (in France) to extend to family reunification. The European Court has been active on matters of rights of citizens of member states; but may not be able to be so active with respect to Third Country nationals. 14 Family membership may be at least as valid a basis for discriminating as skills, health, income and so on, that are often applied, and indeed added to, conditions for family reunification. 15 See e.g. Honohan 2001 Honohan , 2002 for a characterisation of the special obligations of citizens in these terms. 16 What is similar between citizens and families is that they are both valuable relationships that generate special obligations. While we may (arguably) see a duty of citizens to fellow citizens and residents to be concerned for one another's welfare and to allow them to develop family life, the mutual concern of citizens is different from that of family members. 17 There is, however, no clear connection between an emphasis on family migration and an ethnic conception of citizenship. Though ethnic preference would be the epitome of partiality, ethnic states (defining membership in ethnic terms) have no reason to be more favourable to family reunification. While the nation is often portrayed as a family, this analogy is limited, as the immediacy of family relationships distinguish them from those between co-nationals. While an ethnically discriminatory state could favour family migration in order to maintain the existing racial composition of the country, if there are other pathways to immigration, this may work in other
